ABSTRACT Response to Kyla Wazana Tompkins, "On the Limits and Promise of New Materialist Philosophy, " published in Lateral 5.1. Huang reassesses the methodological implications of new materialisms by grappling with renewed attention to form in literary studies to articulate the varying processes by which racial difference becomes elided, rematerialized, and remade.
During the Q&A, one presenter, whose work situates UFOs within U.S. Cold War politics, was asked a question that in part queried if "she really believed in UFOs. " The audience laughed, and once the chuckles had subsided, the presenter replied that it was convenient that they could quickly answer "no, " while still af rming the intellectual value of pursuing such a project. I understood the presenter's point. Yet at the same time (and as the presenter themself acknowledged), such a disavowal reinforces the very values of scienti c objectivity and distance their work seeks to challenge. Such questions of belief and nonbelief are even more fraught in relation to race, gender, sexuality, disability, and other axes of embodied difference. And so I was stung by the revelation that despite knowing that race is a mutable ction that is socially and materially distributed through networks of power, I could never say, even for a moment, that I do not "believe in race. " As a junior scholar working on the imbrications of scienti c discourse with Asian American racialization, I want to refuse any Manichean question-of belief or nonbelief-that leaves a contained and singular de nition of race intact. Instead, the great opportunity of New Materialism seems to lie, as Kyla Wazana Tompkins suggests in her pithy and provocative piece "On the Limits and Promise of New Materialist Philosophy, " in pressuring how we understand what race is.
This opportunity is still yet to be realized, as race remains underrepresented in the scholarship of New Materialism as well as in the bodies of those working within this sundry eld. What results from this lack of representation are, unsurprisingly, too-quick dismissals of "representationalism, " which as Tompkins argues, manifest as: the ongoing citation of "the power of language" or "representationalism" as a problem that is corrected by new materialism, as well as . . . loose and vague references to "identitarian thinking" or "identity politics" as a failure to ground and create productive political thought.
In the domain of literary studies, her words offer a necessary reminder that collapsing the politics of difference into a teleology that amounts to "less representational=more radical=more better" serves no one, least of all minoritized constituencies whose creative experiments have always been disquali ed as insuf ciently imaginative or aesthetically- minded. What is being represented has never been limited to the "real" experiences of minoritized peoples; it has always also been about how dividing practices of epistemology delineate worlds, cut (white, male) humans from (non-white, female, queer, disabled, animal) nonhumans, and disarticulate humans from their environments. aboutness functions as an assessment of relevance, and within the racialized economy of academic knowledge (canonical knowledge reproducing whiteness continues to center the US academy and thus ensures that higher education maintain its long tradition of contributing to the reproduction of social inequality), preserves the (racist) epistemologies of (neo)liberalism through a reproductive logic that is utterly unqueer. Yau's poem, so short and sardonic as to render it doggerel, is below in full: 
Yau's Confessions of a Recycled Shopping Bag
The third derivation lies in the poem's appropriation of the conventions of confessional poetry, especially its autobiographical "I. " "Confessions" puts parodic pressure on the presumed self-importance of such an "I" by housing it in a denigrated commodity product.
The anaphoric repetition "I used to be" conjures up a washed up country singer, a hasbeen. It also suggests the end of utility, as in "I [was] used to be. " A different function and identity for each previous incarnation. The harsh doubling of consonants-"bottle, " "wattle, " "spittle, " "piddle, " and "colleague"-violently cleaves the words into two syllables, lending a machinic, punctuated, quality of production to the lines.
Such fragmentation of the lyric-I suggests that reading the speaker as a singular persona is inadequate; the recycled shopping bag's lyric-I is distributed across space, time, and form in a manner that is more insidious than capacious. The poem is an example of what Charles Bernstein refers to as "sprung lyric, " which "stands between the sentence-driven and discursive drives of the new prose-format poems and the traditional I-centered free verse lyric of personal sincerity or epiphany. " "I" is a container, like the recycled shopping bag, of these various colors, products, and objects, both human and nonhuman, but one whose various transmutations are only visible once narrated. The undeviating In the OOO conversation, matter can never be apprehended as such: it comes into legibility only as form. In this way, OOO is extraneous to the conversations taking place in feminist, queer, and critical race theory, most of which take as true the idea that the relationship between discursivity and materiality is circular and, in Karen Barad's terms, intra-active.
As feminist theory's signal insights on the subject/object divide remind us, there is still matter and meaning between objects and forms. The dif culty of perceiving such material entanglements does not make them any less animating or powerful. New Materialist understandings about the contingency of human form are productive not because they move us "beyond" race (they don't, and never will), but because they make visible how race is always embedded within the production of the cultural forms used to fabricate the human. To believe in race is to believe in racial formation as synthetic and syncretic, to percept that race traverses disciplinary boundaries, and to trace its material-semiotic links to places where it no longer seems to be "about" race at all. But most importantly, it is to understand that race is not something that resides only in the human outlines of raced bodies. There is no master molecule of race; following race all the way down means, per Donna Haraway, staying with the troubled concatenations of desire and matter that will always exceed our ability to capture and contain them.
